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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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21 June 1983

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM:

Acting National Intelligence Officer  
for Africa

SUBJECT: Talking Points

Attached are some speculative thoughts on Chad for your session with Judge Clark. The weight of the current reporting suggests Habre may lose if the Libyans use air support against him. If he is forced to retreat, he is not necessarily finished, and we need to think ahead to what the US does next in what will be a very muddy situation.

Attachment:  
as stated

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## TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

CHAD

Even if the Habre forces are forced from their base at Faya Largeau, this may not be the end of Habre and it may take some time before another major event occurs that affords us the opportunity to see how the Chad scenario continues to unfold.

--Habre has the capacity to inflict substantial losses on the Libyan-backed dissident forces. This would require Goukouni to pause and refit. It took them many months before they moved on Faya Largeau.

--Habre might still control N'Djamena even though in a weakened condition.

Much depends on how the Libyans intend to proceed. Qadhafi needs to weight several alternatives.

--Does he set up Goukouni in Faya and support him as an alternative government to Habre?

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--Does he push on to N'Djamena and risk the exposure that would come with the substantial materiel support he would have to provide Goukouni for the dissidents to take the Chadian capital?

In all likelihood, Qadhafi does not want to reoccupy N'Djamena. He was badly burned by his presence there before. He apparently would be content with any government that recognized Libya's claim to the Aozou Strip.

There is a danger Qadhafi may take a more subtle diplomatic approach to oust Habre if the Chadian leader is weakened by a defeat at Faya Largeau, and Qadhafi chooses to avoid a deepening involvement in Chad.

--He might seek to enlist the aid of other Africans who are tired of the Chadian situation to push for a new government of national union with or without Habre.

--This has been tried unsuccessfully before in Chad, but might attract support.

--Such a move, if supported by other Africans and/or Western governments would be designed to pressure Habre to give way in the interest of national reconciliation.

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--To accomplish this, Qadhafi might try to get his friend, Mengistu -- now chairman of the OAU -- to use his influence to swing the OAU behind such an effort. This would muddy the waters badly and severely test our African friends who want both the Chad problem solved and the Libyans out of the country.

We cannot count on the French to play a positive role in whatever happens in Chad.

--They have played a significant role in Chad since its independence and have never been able to control events there. The Mitterrand government shows no interest in being involved there again.

--Paris is constrained by its commercial relations with Tripoli to play an activist role in Chad at this time.

--The French do not like Habre and are not adverse to seeing Goukouni of some other leader playing a role in Chad.

--The French government might be receptive to a Libyan approach on the notion of a new government of national union in Chad.

In sum, a Habre defeat at Faya Largeau may not be as decisive a factor as we now believe and we may need to maintain our flexibility to cope with subsequent events, unclear as they may be.

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